## Imprecise prediction and reliability in intervals - talk at WPMSIIP'12 (13 September, 2012)

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- Last Updated on Friday, 21 September 2012 15:09
- Published on Thursday, 13 September 2012 08:00

On 13 September, 2012, Roland Poellinger gives a talk at the Fifth Workshop on Principles and Methods of Statistical Inference with Interval Probability (WPMSIIP'12) in Munich, the title: "Superimposing Imprecise Evidence onto Stable Causal Knowledge: Analyzing ‘Prediction’ in the Newcomb Case". The talk sketches a possible extension of the CKP framework and outlines an agenda for introducing interval probabilities into causal reasoning, where specific concepts need to be formalized in an imprecise way – (un)reliability as quality of prediction in the Newcomb case. From the abstract:

In this talk I will prepare the ground for a understanding of causality that enables the causal decision theorist to answer Nozick’s challenge with the solution of one-boxing by drawing on the framework of *causal knowledge patterns*, i.e., Bayes net causal models built upon stable causal relations (cf. Pearl 1995 and 2000/2009) augmented by non-causal knowledge (*epistemic contours*). This rendition allows the careful re-examination of all relevant notions in the original story and facilitates approaching the following questions:

- How may causality in general be understood to allow causal inference from hybrid patterns encoding subjective knowledge?
- How can the notion of
*prediction*be analyzed – philosophically and formally? - If all relations given in the model represent stable causal knowledge, how can imprecise evidence be embedded formally? Or in other words: How can the
*unreliable predictor*be modeled without discarding the core structure?

Finally, in what way could *unreliable prediction* be modeled with interval probability, as motivated by considerations in Nozick’s treatise? And what should be the interpretation of such a rendition?

## The Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy is on iTunes U!

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- Last Updated on Friday, 21 September 2012 15:09
- Published on Friday, 17 June 2011 11:10

## Forum Logik: Logik, formale Epistemologie, mathematische Philosophie

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- Last Updated on Friday, 21 September 2012 15:09
- Published on Monday, 12 April 2010 15:49

Im Wintersemester 2010/11 soll regelmäßig unregelmäßig der Logik-Jour Fixe fortgeführt werden (alle 2, 3 oder 4 Wochen - je nach Interessen-, Termin- und Themenlage). Alle an Logik, formaler Epistemologie und mathematischer Philosophie interessierten Postmags können sich dazu bei Roland Poellinger melden. Raum und Zeiten sowie die Adresse einer Mailingliste zur schnellen Kommunikation werden Anfang des Semesters bekanntgegeben. Weitere Informationen und Dokumente hier ...

## "Formal Informal: The Markov Assumption" | MCMP joint event with Foundations of Statistics (13 June, 2012)

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- Published on Tuesday, 12 June 2012 22:00

On 13 June, 2012, the MCMP is meeting the LMU Stats Department again: "Formal Informal" will center about "The Markov Assumption". Join us for the discussion in an open round at 6:30pm, Alte Bibliothek, room 245 (Ludwigstraße 33). Presenters will be Conor Mayo-Wilson (CMU Philosophy, currently visitor at the MCMP), Marco Cattaneo (LMU Statistics), and Roland Poellinger (MCMP/LMU).

From the manifesto: Bayesian nets are a powerful means of representing conditional independencies between variables in compact manner. Whatever the size of the domain, consistent inference is facilitated by one simple local requirement: The Markov assumption states that a variable is independent of all other non-successors given the values of its parents in the graph. In causal guise: Direct causes screen off their direct effects from other causal influences. What other ways of reading the Markov assumption are there? Why is it justified? Where does it hold? How can it be bent?

Download the invitation here as a PDF document.

## Structuring and Presenting Thoughts with Prezi

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- Last Updated on Friday, 21 September 2012 15:09
- Published on Monday, 21 February 2011 09:12

Go visit prezi.com and create some prezis to get your thoughts structured and to present your research! Come back to find a tutorial on how to use Prezis and LaTeX plus beamer class for your projects in mathematical philosophy (coming soon).

## Talk "Newcomb's Paradox – Wissen ordnen und erschließen in hybriden Netzen" @ Foundations of Statistics (16 May, 2012)

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- Last Updated on Friday, 21 September 2012 15:09
- Published on Tuesday, 15 May 2012 22:00

On 16 May, 2012, Roland Poellinger gives the talk "Newcomb's Paradox – Wissen ordnen und erschließen in hybriden Netzen" at the LMU Research Seminar Foundations of Statistics (Statistics Department, Ludwigstraße 33, room 245 – 6:30pm). In various approaches to solutions of the paradox the principle of dominance and the principle of maximum expected utilities are balanced or tweaked in more or (more often) less natural ways. Reconsidering the concept of prediction as an epistemic change of state yields a compact and intuitive rendition of the problem. Excerpt from the abstract: "In diesem Vortrag möchte ich die Modellierung des Paradoxons in Bayes‘schen kausalen Modellen erläutern, wie sie von Pearl (1995 oder 2000/2009) definiert und von Wolfgang Spohn („Reversing 30 Years of Discussion: Why Causal Decision Theorists Should One-Box“) bzw. Meek & Glymour (1994) zur Analyse von Newcomb’s Problem herangezogen werden. Als Antwort auf diese Ansätze möchte ich im zweiten Teil meiner Diskussion meinen Lösungsvorschlag in *Causal Knowledge Patterns* (einer Erweiterung des Bayesnetz-Frameworks mit intensionalen Informationsbrücken) präsentieren, um schließlich – näher an der Intuition und der ursprünglichen Formulierung von Nozicks Geschichte – bei der Lösung des „one-boxing“ anzugelangen."

## LMU Workshop "Causal Worlds" (27 Jan 2011)

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- Last Updated on Friday, 21 September 2012 15:09
- Published on Monday, 31 January 2011 08:41

The philosophical workshop "Causal Worlds" on aspects of semantics and pragmatics in David Lewis, Peter Menzies, and Judea Pearl took place on 27 Jan 2011 as an Open Session in the Forum Logik Series under the "Patenschaft" of Hans Rott (Regensburg University). Roland Poellinger commented on Stefan Ruhland's talk about the question "Is Causality an Absolute Relation?". Find more info about the speakers and the talks here.