Causality and Observational Equivalence of Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions

In this talk I present results on the observational equivalence of deterministic descriptions and indeterministic descriptions. These results show that there is a choice between a deterministic and an indeterministic description. Thus the question arises: which description is preferable relative to evidence? If none of them is preferable, this would amount to underdetermination. I criticise the extant philosophical answers to this question and propose a new answer. Then I assess the implications of the results on observational equivalence on accounts of causality, focusing on the example of billiard systems. In particular, I discuss the implications for accounts of causality which require that causality has to be deterministic, and I examine whether the Causal Markov condition holds for the indeterministic descriptions.

July 9, 2010 / 2.40 p.m. / LMU Munich (M210)
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